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Abstract
This article examines the fourteen conditions constituting
Levinson and Alperson’s taxonomy of conditions for temporal
arts.  It claims that some of the conditions and several of the
lists of arts exemplifying them need revision.  It recommends
adding a new condition concerned with the effects of the
passage of time on gardens, environmental sculpture, and
outdoor installations.  The article concludes that gardens may
be a model for understanding and appreciating other arts
sharing the same bi-(multi-) modality.
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1.  Introduction
In “What Is a Temporal Art?,” Jerrold Levinson and Philip
Alperson answer the title’s question by proposing a list of
conditions, one or more of which is sufficient to classify an art
work as temporal.[1]  They situate their argument in the
context of well-known claims by Gotthold Lessing, Victor
Zukerkandl, and others that some arts, such as music, are
temporal and others, such as painting, are not, and they aim
“to cover all that might conceivably be meant in predicating
temporality of an art form.”[2]
Their article has four sections.  Section one is a short
introduction.  Section two is a descriptive list of thirteen
conditions qualifying an art work as temporal.  Section three
assembles those conditions into object-, experience-, and
content-focused groups and, acknowledging the groups'
interconnectedness, proposes a fourteenth  condition that
encompasses the other thirteen.  Section four addresses the
question of whether one art is the most temporal of all.  
In this paper, I first offer a general critique of the intent of
Levinson and Alperson’s article and the assumptions it involves.
 Second,  I examine critically the fourteen conditions for
temporal art to assess the validity and relevance of those
individual conditions and the implications for membership, or
non-membership, of the category that each condition brings.
 After a brief consideration of  the questions Levinson and
Alperson raise regarding the aesthetic values of different
manifestations of time and temporality I suggest, finally, that
an understanding of how gardens function may lead to a better
understanding and richer experience of works in some other
art genres.
2.  General critique
I will now clarify what I mean by the word 'time' because my
use of that word has a bearing on my analysis of Levinson and
Alperson’s paper.  I adopt the meaning of time from Thomas
Clifton in Music as Heard[3] as interpreted by Jonathan Kramer.
This meaning is concise, uses straightforward language, and
emphasizes the evental, processual, and temporal aspects of
the art experience with which Levinson and Alperson are
concerned.  According to Kramer, “[t]ime is a relationship
between people and the events they perceive.”[4]  Time,
therefore, is not a thing that exists independently.  It exists
only by way of our personal or communal experiencing of
objects and events.  Nor can time flow.  It is, instead, our
experiences of objects and events that flow, and in this way an
apparent time appears to flow.
Understanding time in this way means that what is commonly
thought of as chronological time is “little more than a social
convention [for ordering the relationship between people and
the events they perceive] agreed to for practical reasons.”[5] 
Chronological time  tells us nothing about the process of the
relationship between people and events;  it merely allows us to
agree when and for how long the process occurred.
The relational process of time encompasses what we perceive
and experience happening to, in, and between objects and
events before they begin, as they persist, and after they have
ceased.  In art works that unfold temporally, the process of this
relationship is a complex, continuous process of framing,
reframing, remembering, and anticipating features of the work
that are organized at different hierarchical levels.  In music, for
example, we pay attention to pitches, rhythms, dynamics,
meters, and formal elements organized into phrases, melodies,
sections, movements, and entire works.  That chronological
time is meanwhile passing is irrelevant (although not by all
accounts) to the evolving musical piece except as an aid to,
say, coordinating our watches to agree about the length of the
process, synching tracks in a recording studio, or identifying a
historical period when the work was composed or performed in
the past. [6]
The authors use 'time,' 'temporal,' and 'temporality' in ways
that require the words to stand for different concepts in
different sections in their article.  I refer to this in more detail
below.  Briefly, in conditions 1, 2, and 6, 'time' refers to
something commonly thought of as chronological time.  In
condition 7 'time' and 'timelessness' refer to something like
experiential time; and in condition 9 'time' refers to “a kind of
time that is peculiar to the [work]” and is presumably neither
chronological nor experiential, in the commonly understood
senses of those terms.
I believe it is a shortcoming of their article that the authors do
not venture any definition of what  they mean when they use
the terms 'time,' 'temporal,' and 'temporality.'  This is perhaps
understandable given that the point of the article is to define
by way of conditions what everyone means when they use
these terms.  I hope to show, however, that their unstated
biases regarding the meaning of these terms lead to
unsatisfactory inclusions and omissions from the lists of art
works and genres exemplifying each condition, as well as to
other problems.  I believe (a) that the authors' use of 'time,'
'temporal,' and 'temporality' to refer to different, unspecified
concepts within their article is confusing and (b) that these
same terms have meanings other than those implied,
meanings that, were they to be recognized and included, would
affect some of the conclusions the authors draw.
Levinson and Alperson present a taxonomy of thirteen
conditions, plus one additional overarching condition, having a
bearing on an art work’s temporality.  Their conditions are
presented as sufficient, but it can be argued that some of
them, including conditions 1, 2, and 3, are indeed necessary
for an art work to be temporal.  The taxonomy is presented as
a straightforward classificatory tool.  The authors say they aim
“…to make sense of familiar intuitions about the arts…,” and it
is therefore reasonable to assume that by using such a
taxonomy, we can work out what artists, performers, the
public, and even philosophers mean when they use the terms
 'time' and 'temporal' in relation to the arts.[7]
Because it is a classificatory taxonomy, the authors generally
avoid normative terminology, although 'proper,' 'properly,' and
'centrally' make occasional appearances.  They do, however,
refer to normative claims made by others, including Susanne
Langer, Susan Sontag, Gerald Mast, Victor Zukerkandl, and
Gotthold Lessing.
The authors claim to be interested in the possession and
expression of time and temporality by standard or paradigm
works in the genres of an art form.  And they add further, “…
that avant-garde or self-consciously experimental instances of
the art might not meet the condition would not count against
its adequacy as a characterization of the art form’s temporal
status.”[8]  I believe their exclusion of the avant-garde and
experimental is problematic for three reasons.  
First, few philosophers (including, I imagine, the authors)
would consider devising a set of conditions to define art on the
grounds that the avant-garde need not be included.  For
example, Levinson's intentional-historical definition, “… an
artwork is a thing that has been seriously intended for regard
in any way pre-existing or prior artworks are or were correctly
regarded” seems generous in relation to avant-garde genres
and objects.[9]  
Second, the avant-garde often becomes conventional in time.
 What was cutting edge when Levinson and Alperson published
their paper is by now old hat and even, in some cases,
established.  In recent times this has been especially true of
progress and possibilities in the fields of computer and video
arts, the scale and rate of which developments the authors, to
be fair, could not reasonably have foreseen.
Third, their exclusion of the avant-garde and experimental is
problematic because some of the most important artistic
manifestations of time and temporality are to be found in
progressive and avant-garde art.  For example, Stravinsky’s
Rite of Spring (1913), Beckett’s Waiting for Godot (1953),
Dali’s Persistence of Memory (1931), and Joyce’s Ulysses (c.
1920) are all works that have progressed from being avant-
garde to being classic in the last century.  These works were
avant-garde because of their temporality, among other
elements, and it seems unreasonable to assume that
temporality will not continue to be an important, even
constitutive element of some avant-garde art.
So while I recognize the authors’ qualification about avant-
garde and experimental art, I will refer to such works in this
paper because not to do so means that important areas of
temporal art will remain unaccounted for.
3. The taxonomy
In this section I quote Levinson and Alperson’s fourteen
conditions in turn and consider each of them in the
paragraph(s) following its quotation.
(i) Objects of the art form require time for their
proper aesthetic appreciation or comprehension.
I agree with the authors that this condition is so widely
inclusive that it is not useful for their project.  I agree with
them that all art objects and events, and our experiences of
them, have a durational aspect and that “[t]his temporal
aspect is … not likely to be what anyone has in mind in thinking
of the temporal arts as a special group.”[10]  Unlike the
authors, however, I believe that this condition usefully
describes three nontrivially temporal aspects of what could be
considered a “proper aesthetic appreciation or comprehension”
of works of art.
First, as already noted, it is generally accepted that activities
such as looking at a painting or sculpture are durational
activities even though painting and sculpture are not commonly
thought of as temporal art forms.  Some claim, however,  that
our experience of all works of art is nontrivially temporal
because it inevitably involves our own past and our past
experiences of art, including previous experiences of a given
work.[11]  This particular temporal aspect of our experience
enables us to assess, compare, and, potentially, understand
better and experience more deeply a given work of art.
 Moreover, because our experiences of art are to a degree
communal, they are in this way open to being constituted not
only by our personal past but also by our shared communal
past experiences of art and the culture from which it arises.
Second, T. S. Eliot described how, when composing a new
work, the creative artist responds to and is correctly influenced
by an awareness of the implications of the unique temporal
location of the new work within its own creative tradition and
chronology.[12]   And similarly, Eliot argued, an “accurate”
experience of a given work requires attention not only to any
temporal relationships within that work but also to the
temporal relationships between that work and its precursors
and successors in the genre.
There is a third way of conceptualizing our experience of all art
as nontrivially temporal.  According to a view promoted by
Hans-Georg Gadamer, all art works, whether commonly
regarded as temporal or not, have their own unique “time.”[13]
 Gadamer compared that time to the temporal features and
qualities of recurring feasts and festivals.  He argued that an
ideal encounter with a work of art involves tarrying with the
work in its own time world and that, in this way, all (ideal)
artistic experience is unavoidably temporal.
None of these three interpretations of Condition 1 is referred to
in Levinson and Alperson’s article, and I believe the paper is
therefore an incomplete survey of what constitutes a temporal
art.  That said, the introduction and application of three
additional interpretations would have increased the length of
the study to something far greater than could be presented in
one article.  Perhaps their overarching Condition 14, Objects of
the art form are such that their proper appreciation centrally
involves understanding of temporal relations within them,
deliberately and retrospectively limits the scope they had
envisaged for their article.
(ii) Objects of the art form require a significant
interval of time for the mere perception or
apprehension of their full extent.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal.  The
authors, however, omit two arts from their list of qualifying art
forms.  One omission is minor, and I deal with it first.
Painters sometimes create horizontally or vertically extensive
works, or exhibit groups of paintings that are to be “read” as
one composite work.  In such cases a “significant interval of
time” is required merely to absorb them.  An example of a
composite work is Sidney Nolan’s Ned Kelly series, and an
example of a horizontally extensive painting is Colin McCahon’s
Walk, measuring over twelve meters in overall length. (The
latter work’s title refers punningly to its content and, possibly,
to a desirable way of appreciating it.)
Second, contemporary philosophers have claimed that some
gardens can qualify as works of art and that gardens as diverse
as André Le Nôtre’s for the palace at Versailles and Martha
Schwartz’s suburban Bagel Garden are paradigms of such
gardens.[14]  Although Levinson and Alperson don’t mention
gardens here, or indeed anywhere, in their article, I claim that
some gardens are candidates for being the most extensive art
works and therefore they make the highest durational demands
for the “mere perception or apprehension of their full extent.”
 Several large gardens exceed in this regard the demands of,
say, the cathedrals of Chartres and Notre Dame, which are
noted elsewhere in the article for their “extraordinary size and
scale.”[15]
(iii) Objects of the art form require time in
presentation, i.e., they require performance or
exposition of some sort over an interval of time;
the parts of the artwork are not all available at
any one moment, but only consecutively.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal.  Once
again, however, gardens constitute an important omission from
their list of conforming arts.[16]  I claim that gardens have a
greater potential than any other art form to exhibit noticeable
nonaleatory changes while still retaining their ontological
identity.[17]  But unlike the other arts the authors refer to,
gardens are not performances, as the condition deems
alternately necessary, because they do not have performers.
[18] Gardens’ most important  constituents are living plants,
and plants are not performers; sweet peas do not perform,
they simply do what sweet peas do.  But the ways in which a
garden designer arranges the garden elements result in certain
temporal (and visual) events being exposed, juxtaposed, and
counterpointed, and in this way the garden can be seen as an
exposition, as alternately required by this condition.
Finally, a garden is never the same; it is always perceivably
changing.  So, in this additional sense, the time of the
“presentation” of the garden is limited only by the garden’s
initial installation and final destruction.
Similar claims can be made for installations such as Damien
Hurst’s Thousand Years (1990) or his Let’s Eat Outdoors Today
(1990-91), which feature living and decomposing elements,
such as items of food, maggots, flies, blood, and a cow’s head.
 Such works require time for their presentation, and not all
aspects and stages of the component elements are available
for viewing at any one time.
(iv) Objects of the art form consist of elements or
parts arranged in a linear order, with definite
direction, from first to last.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal and
generally agree with the authors’ list of conforming arts.
Although it’s not made clear in this condition, I assume that
the authors mean to imply that the elements within the work
are arranged by its creator in an immutable sequence.  If this
is the case then, with a small extension to the implied
meaning, the condition can also accommodate some
established contemporary works with a linear order that start
and finish but do not have an invariable sequence of parts or
sections within their overarching structure.  If the condition’s
implied meaning is expanded so that the arrangement of
elements can be done by the creator, the performer, the
recipient, or some combination of these agents, then a number
of previously excluded works can be included.
One such work is Julio Cortazar’s Hopscotch.[19]  It is an early
example of a literary work in which the reader is free to order
the sections as he sees fit or as his fancy takes him. In such
works the reader organizes the structure of the narrative for
himself. [20]   This is different from, say, skipping ahead to
read the ending of a novel before it appears sequentially
according to the author’s ordering.  In the former case, the
ordering of sections constitutes part of the work’s aesthetic
interest.  In the latter case the reordering of sections results
merely from the reader’s impatience or indifference.
(v) Objects of the art form are properly
experienced in the order in  which their elements
are determinately arranged, and at a rate defined
by, or inherent in, the artwork itself or its
prescribed mode of presentation or performance.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal and
generally agree with the authors’ list of conforming arts.  I
have, however, two comments to make.
First, the authors ignore the fact that poetry is, first and
foremost a performance art.  Spoken poetry certainly conforms
with this condition, but poetry is listed, along with the novel, as
an art that is not accommodated by the condition.  The authors
do, however, admit that the way the poem is written may
influence the rate at which a silent reading of it proceeds.
 Somewhat surprisingly, given their earlier comments regarding
experimental art, they support this latter claim by referring to
the work of the (then) experimental Québéçoise poet Nicole
Broissard.  
Second, just as in the case of Condition 4, a small alteration of
intent in the text of the condition allows the accommodation of
established contemporary works.  The authors' qualification
“determinately arranged” means, I assume, "arranged by the
creator of the work."[21]  If the intent can be broadened to
mean "arranged by the creator or performer of the work," then
a significant group of other works can be included.
An example of such a work is Karlheinz Stockhausen’s 1956
"Piano Piece XI," in which the ordering and the manner of
performance of the composed sound segments are at the same
time free in their sequencing and highly determined in their
articulation.  The performer is free to choose the sequence of
sound segments, each of which finishes with a meticulously
specified set of written instructions about how to play the next
segment, which will be the segment, in the extra-large musical
score, on which the pianist’s eyes next light.[22]  This work is
one example of aleatory and quasi-aleatory music that
appeared during the third quarter of the twentieth century.
 While much of it proved ephemeral in its appeal, some, like
the Stockhausen piece, have endured and are now considered
classics.
(vi) Objects of the art form are such that non-
temporally extended  parts of the object do not
count as aesthetically significant units of it. That
is to say, such parts are not isolatable for study in
a way that contributes significantly to the full
experience of the object.
I do not consider this condition useful in achieving what I take
to be the authors’ aim of distinguishing between two different
genres of temporal art.  They compare music and films and
decide that music is temporal in a way that film is not,
explaining that music is not divisible into small units “isolatable
for study in a way that contributes significantly to the full
experience of the object,” whereas film is. [23] 
The authors’ comparison of “freeze-framing” a film or video
and “pausing” a music CD is unhelpful.  Their claim that you
get a complete but brief sense unit when you freeze a film and
nothing when you pause a CD is, of course, true.  But while the
claim does tell us how the two arts and their modes of
reproduction are differently constructed, it tells us nothing
about how the arts (a) can be similarly experienced and (b)
have similar content with respect to this condition.
Both film and music require the perceiver to combine and
organize discrete sensory inputs into larger sense units.  In the
former case, because its technology limits it to a fast-moving
succession of mechanically presented, discrete images, a film
can be dissected to expose one or more of the constituent
discrete sensory inputs.  In the latter case, music, as perceived
when it is performed or heard live, is not experientially
separable into a series of discrete, minute, isolated phenomena
in the way that, analogously, film is when it is projected.[24]
 But this does not mean that a temporal slice of music is either
inaudible or not “isolatable for study.”[25]  A single chord, for
example, can certainly be an “aesthetically significant unit” of a
musical composition.[26]  The first 136 bars of the prelude to
Wagner’s Das Rheingold are built on a single chord (harmony)
introduced gradually at the start, and that chord’s varied
appearances in, for example, bars 1, 5, and 11 could well serve
as aesthetically significant units isolatable for study.  And
further, to reintroduce the avant-garde, Stockhausen’s "Piano
Piece IX" begins with 184 repetitions of a single chord.
 Individual chords taken appropriately from these two
examples surely constitute aesthetically significant units.
Likewise, in poetry a single monosyllabic word, or in dance a
frozen movement or gesture, or in a garden a “frozen” view
may all be aesthetically significant units.  That “sound bites” of
music, poetry, dance, and gardens are not, like film,
convenient segments, mechanically extractable at the rate of
twenty-four divisions per second seems irrelevant.
Furthermore, a sound bite taken from an instance of these arts
may also reasonably be any (shortish) length, it need not
necessarily equate to the length of a single frame of film. It
would be difficult to argue that such extracts “are not isolatable
for study in a way that contributes significantly to the full
experience of the object.”
(vii) Objects of the art form are about time, or our
experience thereof, in some significant way.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal, but I
claim that music, some minor exceptions notwithstanding,
should not, for the reason I now introduce, feature on the
authors' list of conforming genres.
If the preposition about in the condition is taken to mean
something like “having as its subject” or “concerning,” then the
paintings and film they cite are nicely accommodated by the
condition.  Although they do not cite a novel, Proust’s In
Search of Lost Time or Joyce’s Ulysses would be appropriate
examples.  These works are all representational.  We know
they are dealing with time because the words or images they
contain make this clear.  Thus they are about time or our
experience of it.  But the same cannot be said of music, which
is not representational in this way.  Although I claim that music
cannot be about these things,  an ideal experience of listening
to music may entail a particular temporal encounter that is
triggered by the music, or by the title of  a piece.  For
example,  “Regard du Temps,” from Messiaen’s Vingt Regards
sur l’enfant Jésus, may suggest that that piece has a temporal
content.  I return to this claim under Condition 9 below.
It is possible that the preposition about in the condition
references Arthur Danto’s notion of “aboutness”- that is, the
quality of an object or event that distinguishes it as an art work
from other things.  If this is the case, then music, and
theoretically any other art, potentially conforms to 
Condition 7.
(viii) Objects of the art form use time as a
material, or as an important structural feature.
It is hard to know what the authors intend with the wording of
this condition.  I agree with them that, in a weaker sense, all
art making, performing, and reception are unavoidably
temporal, but, that said, it is not clear why this condition, even
in its stronger sense, needs to exist at all.  It overlaps with
Conditions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, and I’m not convinced that it
accommodates or excludes any genres or combinations of
genres that the other conditions don’t accommodate or
exclude.
Another problem is that the authors here link novels with four
performance arts to make up the primary list of arts
conforming with this condition while, at the same time, they
fail to acknowledge that a novel’s approach to temporality
differs fundamentally from that of the performance arts.  In
whatever way they conceptualize “time,” its presence in a novel
is quite different from its presence in a performance art.
If the condition is to be retained, then I think its stronger claim
can be better served by rewriting it as follows:  “Objects of the
art form use change, including rate(s) of change, which we
necessarily perceive and attend to, in temporal successions, as
a material or as an important structural feature.”  This new
formulation sidesteps the problem caused by the authors’ not
defining “time” and by that concept’s notorious slipperiness.
Finally, the authors name architecture as a genre that may fit
this condition on the basis of what they claim to be the
durational and sequential aspects of our experience of large
buildings such as, in their examples, Notre Dame and Chartres
cathedrals.
Their claim is only partially true because our temporal
experience of such architecture is structured and formed by us
primarily and by the building only secondarily.     
(ix) Objects of the art form generate a kind of
time that is peculiar to them, that exists for a
perceiver only in and through experience of the
work.
I am interested that this condition appears in the taxonomy
because it seems to be in conflict with Alperson’s earlier
position.  In his excellent paper of 1980, “’Musical Time’ and
Music as an 'Art of Time,'" he concludes “…that the use of the
phrase 'musical time' to delineate a special kind of time created
by music is a mistake.”[27]  By itself, this earlier comment
does not mean that the particular condition should not be
included in the taxonomy.  It is simply evidence that there can
be confusion about these matters and that working definitions
of time and temporality might have been included in the paper
and been useful in explaining the apparent volte-face.  While
Condition 9 may be taken to apply to a range of temporal arts,
I would now like to pursue it further simply in relation to music
and Alperson’s quoted comment.
I claimed earlier that “[t]ime is the relationship between people
and the events they perceive.”[28]  If this is the case, then
music cannot on its own be said to generate time, and the
condition should be modified to reflect this.  We could choose
to say instead  that music offers sonic events tailor-made for
our relating to it and that in this way music generates
opportunities for temporal experiences.  Now, if this is the
case, then it may be reasonable to claim that certain
compositions present sonic structures, events, and patterns in
ways that manipulate our reactions and relationships to them.
 And in this particular limited but important sense, we might
say that something akin to musical time does exist.
(x) Objects of the art form represent a series of
events in time distinct from the series of events
constituting the art object.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal, and I
agree that film, novels, and theater are strong examples of
genres conforming with it.  Still it is unclear, however, why the
authors have omitted poetry from their list, given that it shares
with the listed arts the same characteristics in relation to this
condition.
The authors have here chosen to restrict the meaning of
‘represent’ (and, later in the text, ‘representation’) to a version
of what might be called manipulated mimesis.  According to
this view, a sequence of, say, a car chase can (a) be more or
less realistically represented in text or on film and (b) proceed
differently from the sequence of, and take more or less time
than, the time the actual or imagined car chase takes.  The
authors fairly claim that such temporal dislocation and
“distemporization” is a hallmark of the novel and film in
particular.
If they were to broaden the range of meaning of
‘representation ‘ then one further art would appear to become
exemplary of the condition.  They quote Susanne Langer in
support of their Condition 9, and, if they are to take her and
others espousing similar positions, such as Leonard Meyer, at
their word, then music might be said to “represent a series of
events in time distinct from the series of events constituting
the art object.”[29]  According to this view, a suitably qualified
listener reacts to music’s elements in a way that involves re-
enacting emotional, psychical events from her “real” life.
Music, therefore, might be said to represent psychical events in
a sequence and time distinct from the way those events
occurred in real life and without reference to the agents and
events that triggered the psychical events.  This would be in
accord with Langer’s view that music represents or implies
dynamic inner states in our “real” lives and that we are able to
re-experience the emotions of those events without
experiencing the events themselves.  Thus music, too, might
be exemplary of Condition 10.
Plausible as this notion of representation may seem, however, I
claim that it is in fact not representation but re-stimulation or
re-presentation of emotion that is involved in the case of
music.  A listener is not aware of any process or representation
occurring.  Instead, emotions are stimulated in the absence of
any representation of or reference to the generating events
because music cannot represent or refer in these ways.  So,
tempting as it might be to think of Langer’s view of music as in
some way involving representation, this is not the case; and
therefore the view of music’s  potential that I rejected in
connection with Condition 7,  that is, that music can be said to
be about something or to have something as its subject, is
confirmed. 
(xi) Objects of the art form are created in the act
of presentation, so that the time of creation, time
of presentation and (usually) time of reception all
coincide.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal and
agree that improvisatory works are exemplary of it.  At the
same time, I suggest that re-creation be offered as an
alternative to creation in the condition in order to (a) give
greater weight to the role of the interpretive performer of
nonimprovisational works and (b) allow for certain musical
activities, including continuo realizing and cadenza playing, in
which spontaneous or rehearsed improvisation is part of an
otherwise notated work. 
(xii) Objects of the art form require presentation
in a time lived through and by the presenters.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal and
agree that live performances and improvisations are exemplary
of it.
(xiii) Objects of the art form lack relatively fixed
identities over time, but are rather mutable and
shifting.
I accept this condition to describe a work as temporal and
agree that some folk arts with only oral traditions of
transmission are exemplary of it.
The authors offer a final, fourteenth condition that, they claim,
straddles the previous conditions and the implications of their
grouping of them into the three sub-groups referred to earlier. 
It reads:
(xiv) Objects of the art form are such that their
proper appreciation centrally involves
understanding of temporal relations within them.
I agree with the authors that “… when an art form is described
as “temporal,” without any further specification of what is
meant, then [Condition 14] ... provides the best overall default
construal.”[30]  In the condition, however, the word ‘centrally’
creates a problem.  Does it equate to ‘significantly,’ or
’principally,’ or ’is required to?’ The problem is seen most
clearly in the case of arts that have temporal aspects that
constitute their aesthetic appeal and value​​, aspects that are
not the only or the strongest or necessarily the most obvious
claimants to that role in the work. Gardens and environmental
sculptures provide good examples of arts in which aesthetic
appeal and value derive from both temporal and pictorial
(spatial) features of the works.  I do not mean to suggest,
however, that we can consider or quantify the visual and
temporal aspects of such arts as if they are discrete,
independent aspects of a work.  They are complexly
interwoven, and I believe the condition would be improved
were this complexity to be acknowledged.
4.  A new condition
There exists one inescapably important temporal feature that is
not considered anywhere in the taxonomy.  This feature affects
some architecture and installations, all gardens, and some
environmental sculpture, and might be reflected in a new
condition reading as follows:
(xv) Objects of the art form are aesthetically
dependent to varying degrees on the transitions,
movements, actions, and patterns of biological,
diurnal, seasonal, climatic, and sometimes
geological changes, most of which occur in
temporally experienced sequences.
I claim that this proposed condition is of fundamental
importance to the art of gardens. The proposed “condition xv,”
and the content of Section 5 that follows, owe a significant
debt to the important pioneering work in the philosophy of art
gardens carried out by Mara Miller and Stephanie Ross, and by
later writers who have developed similar or related accounts of
gardens.[31]
5.  Four-dimensional works of art
In their conclusion, Levinson and Aplerson suggest that their
work could be extended by responding to two questions: First,
which art is the “most” temporal, and on what basis might that
be determined?  And, second, do some of their conditions for
temporality carry with them more aesthetic significance than
others?
I agree with the authors that an Oscars-style response, where
the winner is the one with the most votes, would be an
unenlightening response to the first question, unless some
agreed value was attributed to each aspect of temporality
making up their taxonomy.  I further agree with them that to
be minimally useful any such ascription of value would need to
be couched in the context of a single, higher-level conception
of art.
I believe their second question is a much more apt one.  But,
as I suggest in relation to Condition 14, ensuring that the
weighing process produces useful results is not as
straightforward as Levinson and Alperson seem to believe.
There are two reasons why the weighing process is more
complex than the authors acknowledge.  First, some art
genres, such as gardens, environmental sculpture, and some
installations and architecture, are at the same time
significantly temporal and significantly pictorial.  They therefore
pose the problem of how their temporality is to be weighed.  Is
it to be weighed as a discrete quality or is it to be weighed as
some sort of composite quality?  And then, is it a temporal-
pictorial quality or is it a pictorial-temporal quality?  Or is it
something else again?  
And, second, even if and when the weighing parameters are
clarified, there remains a bigger question to address:  Is it
possible to make useful and insightful claims about the
aesthetic weight of manifestations of temporality in art works
in general without regard to the weight or significance of
temporality in a specific genre and even in a specific work?  
My answer to this question is a qualified yes, and, in particular,
I propose that the way temporality is manifested in gardens
may have interesting implications for the way we understand
the temporal nature of some other arts.  To this end I will now
restate claims  I have made earlier, here and elsewhere, about
the complex nature of gardens, and I will do so using as a
framework Levinson and Alperson’s tripartite distinction of
object-, experience-, and content-based conditions.[32] 
As objects, gardens typically display both pictorial (spatial) and
temporal qualities and features.  They can be conceptualized as
two-dimensional pictures, as three-dimensional sculptures, and
as four-dimensional environments.  Gardens are also richly
endowed with opportunities for olfactory, kinesthetic, and
tactile experiences.[33]  Because of this complexity I claim
that gardens are, pace Kant, more than “a kind of painting”
with nature’s “products,” and an adequate understanding of
them ought to acknowledge their modal complexity.[34]
As vehicles for experiences based on a viewer’s awareness of
formal qualities and features, gardens offer aesthetic
encounters commonly associated with the visual arts as well as
with the temporal art of music.[35]  Any adequate account of
gardens ought to acknowledge their capacity for providing
these two different but interconnected types of experience(s).
As conveyors of content, gardens can be about visual qualities
such as beauty and grace, they can represent mimetically, they
can in other ways represent concepts such as attitudes to
nature or power and dominion, and they can both be about and
instantiate time and its passage. [36]
In summary, gardens resist neat categorization as a pictorial or
temporal art.  Gardens are both, separately, but they function
as more, or something different again, when considered as
simultaneously pictorial and temporal. Perhaps this feature of
(art) gardens can provide a key to understanding the complex
interplay of temporal and other aesthetic modes in different art
genres where the interplay is significantly present.
A study that builds on Levinson and Alperson’s, while
addressing the issues raised above, could investigate more
complex problems and provide more revealing solutions than
the original paper managed to do.[37]
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